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ABSTRACT 
Entrepreneurs, managers and consumers are attracted by the promise of nonownership 
services in the sharing economy - to enjoy benefits of assets without bearing the costs and 
downsides of ownership. In many cases, reality of nonownership does not live-up to the 
promised value propositions, as present in the struggle of companies like Uber, BP or the 
entire Biopharma industry to exploit the potential of nonownership. In this article we 
unveil the underlying paradox of nonownership, which aims at a smart allocation of 
uncertainty upsides and downsides between providers and clients. We identify the 
potential of relational governance mechanisms to handle the uncertainty challenges 
apparent in nonownership.  We present a pioneering case study of Rolls Royce airplane 
engines which unveils the contribution of relational governance in unfolding the 
economic benefits of nonownership. 
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INTRODUCTION: NONOWNERSHIP - A VALUE PROPOSITION BUILT ON A 
PARADOX 
The rise of new business models such as the sharing economy (Economist, 2013) or 
industrial services (Dachs et al., 2014) indicates that customers value obtaining benefits 
without buying ownership-titles for assets to produce these benefits. Many businesses and 
consumers value the option to rent or lease assets like cars, property or machines, and 
enjoy performance and benefits without the need to buy them.  
While a growing range of businesses aims to benefit from nonownership offerings, some 
companies make mixed experiences. In the sharing economy, platforms like Uber or 
AirBNB find themselves in legal and public relations battles between clients who feel ill-
serviced and providers who find their property damaged if not destroyed by clients ( 
Economist, 2014). In B2B networks, seemingly efficient nonownership arrangements 
frequently dissolve into legal battles. Take for example the an oil-spill of the Deepwater-
Horizon platform causing widespread pollution in the Gulf of Mexico and its shores. 
While the damage happened in a network of outsourced companies, BP was held 
accountable and eventually had to agree to pay 18,1 Bn US $ to US administrations, 
companies and citizens (Borchardt, 2010; Economist, 2015).  
In this article we argue that the value proposition of nonownership is built on a paradox: 
While nonowneship contracts come with the promise to allocate upsides and downsides 
of ownership between clients and providers, benefits and costs of ownership are uncertain 
and thereby to some extent unpredictable. Uncertainty bears potential conflict for 
providers and clients with the potential to damage service performance if not to invoke 
the complete dissolution of the client-provider relationship. Several authors have 
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highlighted the role of trust as a complement to contracts, furnishing parties to 
collaborate and solve potential conflicts in the face of uncertainty. We draw on relational 
contracting theory in order to identify social governance mechanisms that furnish 
contracting parties to realize the potential of nonownership. 
 This paper contributes to marketing research in the following ways. First, it identifies the 
role of uncertainty as a force driving nonownership value. Second, it proposes relational 
governance mechanisms that strenghen capabilities of managers to handle uncertainty in 
nonownership services and thereby empower parties to unlock  value propositions of 
nonownership. Finally, this study extends existing contributions on relational governance 
towards its potential for handling economic uncertainties. 
The paper is structured as follows: The first section sets the scene by elaborating 
the role of ownership for handling uncertainty and teases out value propositions of 
nonownership contracts proposed by economic theories. It then presents the challenges 
and limitations of nonownership, due to the principal limitations of contracts in the face 
of uncertainty. The following section discusses the potential of relational governance to 
address the limitations of contracting and to moderate the downsides of nonownership 
contracts. Then it elaborates the potential contribution of relational governance modes.  A 
case study of Rolls-Royce airplane engines illustrates the role of relational governance. 
Finally, the paper presents research opportunities and a conclusion. 
NONOWNERSHIP, THE RISE OF THE SERVICE ECONOMY AND ITS 
LIMITATIONS 
Taking a closer look, nonownership is anything but a recent phenomenon. For long, some 
researchers have concieved nonownership as a signature attribute of services (see Judd, 
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1964; Lovelock & Gummesson, 2004, Rathmell, 1966).  
 Regarding assets like cars, property or machines, transfer of ownership draws the 
fine line between a goods business and a service business. In a goods business, the seller 
transfers ownership of the asset to the buyer, whereas in service businesses clients enjoy 
the benefits from a service operation without acquiring an ownership title (Lovelock 
&Gummesson, 2004; Ehret & Wirtz, 2010). Thus, several academic researchers have 
been suggesting nonownership as a key criterion for defining services. Indeed, economic 
statisticians have agreed to use nonownership as the defining characteristic for service 
industries (Eurostat, 2009; Jones 2013) .  For example, Eurostat defines services as 
follows: “Service products are entities over which ownership rights cannot be established. 
They cannot be traded separately from their production” (Eurostat, 2009, p. 2).  
In that light, the economic growth of service industries indicates that nonownership has 
become the dominant mode of value delivery in developed economies, where service 
industries provide 60 to 90 percent of economic value added (OECD, 2008). The US 
economy shows some typical features of the rise of service industries: The service sector 
has been growing continuously, had reached almost 60 percent of GDP as early as 1947 
and contributes now around 80 % of the Gross Domnestic Product of the US (see Figure 
1).  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 One key driver is the demand for business services, as apparent in the role of 
business and professional services in the growth of the service sector (see Figure 2 and 
OECD, 2008; Woelfl, 2005; Triplett & Bosworth, 2003). On the economy level, 
companies have have rised the share of services while reducing the share of goods in 
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their external sourcing. as measured by the share of service industries in economy-wide 
intermediate inputs for value creation.  
 The composition of the service sector changed significantly over time (see Figure 
3). While the share of wholesales, retail and transport industries declined over the years, 
educational and social services as well as professional and business services have shown 
the highest growth of service industries (see Table 1).  
____________________________________________________________________ 
[Insert Figures 2 and 3, and Table 1] about here 
  
___________________________________________________________________ 
Both phenomena seem to reflect an underlying trend of specialization, where investment 
into human capabilities translates into specialized professional services (see Buera & 
Kabowsky, 2012). It also resembles the prominent role of business and professional 
services in the rise of the service economy, as evident in numerous empiciral studies 
(Woelfl 2005; OECD, 2008)  
 But what appears as a long-term mega-development confronts researchers and 
managers with non-trivial challenges. Nonownership services bear the promise to relieve 
clients from costs and burdens of ownership. By renting, hiring, or leasing an asset, 
clients get access to its benefits and performance, but can avoid downsides of ownership 
like market obsolescence, technological obsolescence, monitoring or measurement costs 
and many more (Ehret & Wirtz, 2010; Lovelock & Gummesson, 2004; Wittkowski, 
Moeller, & Wirtz, 2013).  
 At the core of the nonownership value proposition is the nonownership contract. 
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This contract entitles clients to the benefits generated with that asset which is owned by 
the service provider. The service provider thereby relieves clients from the costs of 
ownership and gains the right to capitalize profits of asset operation. Thus, for many 
companies it becomes attractive to use nonownership contracts to get the benefits of 
assets and to delegate ownership to specialized providers (Ehret & Wirtz, 2010; Lovelock 
& Gummesson, 2004; Wittkowski, Moeller, & Wirtz, 2013).  
 Nonownership services have been transforming a number of industries, including 
cloud-computing where service providers own infrastructures for delivering IT-services; 
industrial markets, where equipment manufacturers maintain ownership of machines, 
production lines and even entire plants in order to sell performance to industrial client; 
and biopharma markets, where biotechnology firms take ownership of the intellectual 
property and the uncertainty underlying drug development and offer technology licenses 
to pharmaceutical companies whose focus and core competencies lie in on the 
downstream commercialization of drugs (Pisano, 2006).  
However, there are numerous examples where nonownership contracts failed to 
deliver the expected benefits. The biopharma industry was built on the assumption that 
biotechnology companies drive up R&D productivity by taking on ownership for drug 
development and the resulting patents. Then, licenses were provided to pharmaceutical 
companies who would commercialize these drugs. Employing nonownership, 
pharmaceutical companies hoped to boost their R&D productivity and rebuild their 
vanishing drug pipeline. Industry reports and academic studies provide evidence that the 
biopharma industry failed to create value from these nonownership arrangements in the 
last decade. One particular reason is that the R&D process of drug development is 
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volatile and unanticipated results undermine the logic underlying the contractual 
arrangement. For example if results of clinical testing may change the type of treatment 
the drug will be used for, it might not fit to drug portfolio and sales capabilities of the 
pharmaceutical company. Eventually the pharmaceutical company ends up with a drug 
that generates less value than the firm hoped for when closing the licensing contract 
(Pisano, 2006; Ernst & Young, 2013).  
Unanticipated change in the macro-environment may undermine the value 
propositions of nonownership contracts. At times, some industries reverse the trend of 
increased outsourcing. For example, while the automotive industry had driven up the 
share of external sourcing, it reversed outsourcing partly following the post-2007 crisis. 
One crucial factor was the overcapacity effect of weakening demand, driving 
manufacturers to maintain their capacity by reducing external sourcing (Drauz, 2014). In 
the IT industry technological changes frequently lead companies to revise their sourcing 
strategies (Drauz, 2014; Lacity, Wilcocks, & Feeny 1995). 
Not least, black swan events, that is events with extreme low probabilities but 
high potential damage (Taleb, 2007), can undermine the economics of nonownership. For 
example, it did not help BP that it outsourced the operation of the Deepwater Horizon 
drill to a network of companies led by Transocean. Transocean was the legal responsible 
operator of the drilling. When the platform exploded, 11 workers died and 4.9 million 
barrels of oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico, poisoning fishing and seafood waters, 
spoiling seashores and halting the major share of seafront businesses. BP was held legally 
accountable for the damage (Borchardt, 2010). Its nonownership contracts did not hold 
and did not protect it from claim damages. As a result, BP became the public face 
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associated with the disaster and had to take-on the bulk of the financial responsibility for 
cleaning up the sea and the coast and compensating businesses. Furthermore, BP took a 
hit on its brand reputation and potential higher political and legal barriers of future oil 
drilling operations and not least had to stand in for a total of 18,1 Bn US $ for the damage 
that took place under the auspices of its service providers (Borchardt, 2010; Elkind, 
Whitford, & Burke, 2011, Economist, 2015).  
These examples illustrate the conditions and limitations facing companies that 
aim to exploit the potential of nonownership services. They can be summarized as 
follows: First, as in the case of biopharma, uncertainty may undermine benefits of 
nonownership arrangements. In such cases, partners need to look for change in their 
contracts. (Pisano, 2006). Second, as seen in the automotive-outsourcing example, value 
propositions of nonownership contracts may be undermined by rapid changes of strategic 
contexts of providers and clients, thereby deteriorating the benefits for one if not all 
parties. Third, black swan events illustrate the general challenge underlying 
nonownership contracts. Because ownership and respective nonownership arrangements 
entail responsibility for all types of uncertainty, including radical uncertainties, they 
expose contracting parties to conflicts resulting from negative surprises. 
These examples show different facets of the phenomenon of incomplete contracts 
that applies to nonownership. Incomplete contracts face limitations of parties to find ex-
ante solutions for ex-post potential conflicts in the future collaboration (Ghosh & John 
1999; Jap & Anderson, 2007; Jap & Ganesan, 2000). Relational contracting theory holds 
that incomplete contracts need to be complemented by relational governance mechanisms 
that create the "atmosphere" (MacNeil, 1978) in which contracts become effective (Ivens 
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& Blois, 2004; Jap & Anderson, 2007; MacNeil, 1978). While there is extant research on 
the contribution of relational governance in the context of interorganizational 
relationships, governance of the emerging phenomenon of nonownership remains 
neglected.  
ECONOMIC THEORIES AND NONOWNERSHIP VALUE  
Uncertainty and the Value of Ownership 
 Nonownership value can be traced back to the up-and downsides of ownership for 
dealing with uncertainty. Knight (1921) introduced the concept of uncertainty into 
economic thinking by distinguishing between genuine uncertainty (in the literature 
referred as "Knightian" uncertainty) and risk. While the major share of the future is 
unpredictable, some events follow a pattern that can be estimated with the help of 
statistics and extrapolation of probability calculations as practiced in insurance business 
models. In contrast, Knightian uncertainty entails a domain of the future that cannot be 
estimated with statistical approaches and holds genuine surprise for decision makers 
(Foss, Foss, & Klein, 2007; Knight, 1921; Taleb, 2007). Business activity takes place 
under conditions of uncertainty, bolding both opportunities and downsides for market 
participants. While business activity and related contracting partly succeeds in mastering 
or reducing uncertainty, it can never be totally eliminated (Harper, 2003, 2008). 
 Uncertainty is the common denominator of ownership-driven value propositions 
identified by property rights theories as well as entrepreneurship theory (Barzel, 1987, 
1997).  
First, Property rights theory elucidates the governance dimension of ownership. Property 
rights theory holds that ownership reduces the cost of writing contracts (Coase, 1960; 
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Grossman & Hart, 1986; Ghosh & John, 1999). Such costs arise under uncertainty, when 
contracting parties face difficulties in determining the value of an exchange. In absence 
of uncertainty, resource users are capable to specify rights according to their resource 
needs and negotiate contracts that reflect their valuation (Coase, 1960). Ownership 
simplifies contracting as it allocates all rights not specified in a contract to the owner who 
bears uncertainties of the owned assets. The owner enjoys an incentive to bear potential 
downsides, as ownership entitles to potential profits. While users abandon the profit 
potential entailed in asset-ownership, they also reduce their exposure to the downsides of 
ownership-related uncertainties.  
 Typical rights codified in such contracts are the right to use a resource (e.g., 
renting a car or a machine), to change it (e.g., extend performance of a machine), to earn 
income with it (e.g., commercial property) or to transfer ownership (e.g., a retailer 
commissioning for a manufacturer) (Furubotn & Pejovich, 1972).  
 While entrepreneurship theory partly overlaps with property rights theory, it 
assumes the entrepreneurship process of exploring and exploiting business opportunities 
as the crucial force shaping the benefits and costs of ownership (Barzel, 1987, 1997, 
Nooteboom, 1992, 1993). Ownership rights empower entrepreneurs to experiment with 
resources and new resource combinations, and thereby explore business opportunities. 
Thus, the key question for an entrepreneur is if the asset opens the door towards business 
opportunities or is the key to claim the profit from a business project (Foss, Foss, & 
Klein, 2007; Knight, 1920; Kirzner, 1996; Mises, 2007; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). 
Empowered with the right to claim the residual income from their business project, 
entrepreneurs can capitalize opportunities into profits.  
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 Business opportunities arise under conditions of uncertainty, when resources 
show potential that is currently not exploited in the market place or customers show 
needs that are not addressed well by current market offerings (Kirzner, 1996; Shane & 
Venkataramn, 2000). Business projects aiming to explore and exploit such opportunities 
open-up the option for profit but also hold the potential downside of loss. 
 From an entrepreneurial perpsective, companies should refrain from owning 
assets that do contribute neither to exploration nor to exploitation of business 
opportunities.  
 
Nonownership and the allocation of Uncertainty Exposure 
 Nonownership contracts are instrumental in defining and trading services 
generated with the help of productive assets for which ownership rights can be 
established. The contract assigns the provider the role of the owner of assets that are 
applied for generating the service outcome. For clients, the nonownership contracts 
defines the service outcomes they are entitled-to  as well as the terms under which clients 
can use the service outcomes, i.e. rental, access or service fees (Lovelock & Gummesson, 
2004, Ehret & Wirtz, 2010).  
This allocation of titles and rights has substantial implications for the exposure of 
providers and clients to economic uncertainty. Providers bear the financial uncertainty of 
asset ownership, which can turn into profit as well as loss. Providers also enjoy authority 
over their owned assets as far as this is not specified in other contracts or limited by the 
law. This empowers providers to experiment with novel uses for assets, explore novel 
resource combination and not least, identify and commercialize services for commercial 
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trade. In exchange, nonownership contracts are instrumental in monetizing assets owned 
by the providers, thereby reducing some share of financial uncertainty.  In absence of the 
deal with the service client, providers would need to search consider other options for 
capitalizing their assets, thereby increase financial uncertainty and possibly implying 
needs for additional investments. 
 By the same token, clients delegate uncertainty of asset ownership to service providers. 
However, their entitlement for service outputs and performance provides a resource for 
their own value creating activities.  
That is, nonownership value resides on the smart distribution of the up- and downsides of 
ownership and output across co-creating firms (Ballantyne & Varey, 2008; Vargo & 
Lusch, 2004).  
 The following sections discuss value propositions driven by uncertainty 
asymmetries using three related economic theories of the firm.  
Property Rights Theory – Contracting Efficiency 
 Property rights theory provides a theoretical explanation for the role of 
uncertainty in value creation of nonownership services. Ownership becomes valuable 
when a company resides on specific, difficult to substitute assets for its value creation. 
External sourcing would be detrimental because of potential hold-up (i.e., value 
extortion) by suppliers aiming to redistribute profits to their favour (Grossman & Hart, 
1986). Once the asset loses its specificity character, the case for ownership diminishes, 
favoring sourcing by external suppliers. 
 For example, pioneers of automated manufacturing may enjoy a competitive 
advantage over their competitors rendering the equipment specific. When competitors 
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copy the process, the specificity character diminishes, eventually rendering the equipment 
a commodity. In this situation, opportunistic hold-up can be controlled due to competition 
of many suppliers in the market. Eventually, external sourcing becomes the favored 
solution. Such situations open an opportunity for suppliers willing to take-on ownership, 
thereby reducing uncertainty for their clients, supporting their clients to optimize their 
ownership structure while gaining  profit opportunities on their own. 
To summarize, as soon as potential clients are able to specify their service needs from 
assets, it becomes valuable for providers to assume asset ownership and economize the 
costs of ownership for the benefit of their clients (Grossman & Hart, 1986).  
  
Resource-based View: Management Productivity 
 The resource-based view (RBV) holds that a company’s ability to exploit business 
opportunities is constrained by its managerial capacity. Business opportunities are 
uncertain and reside on idiosyncratic insights, ideas or perceptions of entrepreneurs for 
value propositions. In early stages of the exploration and exploitation of opportunities, 
markets have not yet established valid valuations of such business ideas, which renders 
ventures uncertain. The RBV advises management to prioritize its energy on uncertain 
elements of value creation and the development of unique, hard to imitate resources 
(Barney, 1986; Penrose, 1956; Wernerfelt, 1984). In order to unlock scarce management 
capacity, the firm should use external sources for the comparatively “certain” domain of 
the value creation process in order to unlock its management to focus on business 
opportunities, which are genuinely uncertain.  
 The vision of RBV is the intelligent enterprise that unlocks its management 
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capacity for the pursuit of the most promising and profitable business opportunities, 
while delegating complementary activities to a network of external service providers 
(Quinn 1992; Ehret & Wirtz, 2010). Accordingly, companies should design their 
boundaries in order to focus on their core competencies and important business 
opportunities. As such, RBV contributes to explain the rising importance of business 
services by highlighting managerial capabilities as a crucial factor that limits a firm’s 
growth opportunities. RBV provides a compelling argument for nonownership services to 
empower the management of client companies to focus on their most promising activities 
by releasing them from non-core responsibilities (Ehret & Wirtz 2010). 
 From a RBV perspective, nonownership value arises when two companies hold 
asymmetric management productivities in relation to the ownership of a resource. For 
example, the market for IT outsourcing services started to emerge once user companies 
struggled to differentiate themselves through self-managed IT-infrastructure. In contrast, 
specialized IT service providers experienced an opportunity by specializing on owning 
and operating IT resources, providing the key-value proposition by relieving their clients 
from the burdens of ownership (Lacity, Willcocks, & Feeny,1995). Thus, nonownership 
value emerges when companies hold asymmetric perceptions of opportunities from 
specialization, where one company aims to specialize on a domain that the other 
considers as non-core. 
Entrepreneurial Theory of the Firm: Complementary Business Opportunities 
 From an entrepreneurial perspective, nonownership contracts empower companies 
to capitalize on mutual dependent business opportunities (Foss, Foss, & Klein, 2007; 
Chesbrough, 2011). Typical examples are nonownership service providers acting as 
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entrepreneurs of upstream supply chains, while their clients take on the role of 
entrepreneurs of downstream distribution channels (Ghosh & John, 2009), technology 
providers focusing on R&D for technology discovery, catering to technology users 
focusing on commercializing technology (Arora, Belenzon, & Rios, 2014), or platform 
companies distributing software owned by software design-houses (Chesbrough, 2011). 
 In all these examples, business opportunities partly depend on the success of the 
partnering company, creating incentives for collaboration across contractual boundaries 
(Chesbrough, 2011; Wirtz & Ehret 2013). In the design of business models, companies 
aim to share uncertainties in a way that maximizes upsides and/ or minimizes downsides 
of business opportunities across a network. This partly overlaps with contracting and 
resource efficiencies. However, complementary business opportunities relate to a more 
orchestrated approach based on the purposeful design of business architectures that 
combine particular strengths of companies  in line with business opportunities 
(Chesbrough, 2011; Wirtz & Ehret 2013).  
Summary: Nonownership and the allocation of entrepreneurial roles in value 
creation 
 To summarize, the major value contribution of nonownership contracts is the 
allocation of up-and downsides of uncertainty of value creation between the service 
provider and the service client (see fig. 4). A crucial value proposition of nonownership 
contracts is the potential to strengthen contracting parties to focus  on specific 
entrepreneurial opportunities, related to service assets or the use of service outputs. By 
assuming ownership and related costs of asset operation, owners become de-facto 
entrepreneurs of service assets. The economic fortune of providers depends on their 
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ability to identify and implement the highest valued uses of their assets. Thus, 
entrepreneurial focus of providervs resides on identifying valuable services from assets, 
identify potential clients and assure a high value of asset utilization, i.e. by ensuring high 
added value by services as well as enforcing high degree of capacity utilization. In 
contrast, business fortune of clients resides on their ability to use service outputs as part 
of their value creation processes. In a value chain perspective, providers focus rather 
upstream, clients rather downstream.  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
(Insert  Fig. 4 about here) 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Economic theories of the firm illustrate various dimensions of the entrepreneurial roles 
and their implications for uncerthainty impact on service businesses.  Property rights 
theory highlights the role of asset-specificity, as providers bear costs of asset ownership 
for the benefit of their clients. The RBV highlights the potential for improved 
management focus, as nonownership contracts unlock management capacity of the client 
that can be used for strategic priorities further downstream. From the perspective of 
Entrepreneurship theory, the core contribution of nonownership  contracts is to open-up 
business opportunities for asset operation and thereby support specilization of 
entrepreneurial activities.   
 In nonownership services providers take on uncertainties for the benefit for their 
clients, thereby getting an opportunity to generate profits. The key condition for 
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nonownership value is that companies hold asymmetric perceptions regarding the 
uncertainties of the use of a resource (see Table 2). 
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______________________________________________________________________ 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 Economic theories provide a strong rationale that nonownership contracts unlock 
value for both, clients and providers. In the following section we first investigate the 
conceptual limitation of nonownership contracts to realize their promised value 
proposition and explore the potential contribution of relational governance mechanisms. 
THE PARADOX OF NONOWNERSHIP  
 Value propositions of nonownership contracts build on a smart allocation of 
ownership rights transforming uncertainty downsides (i.e., risks) of the client into profit 
opportunities for the provider. However, nonownership contracts entail a paradox: 
Ownership gains its value precisely because of the limitations of contracting under 
conditions of uncertainty (Coase, 1960; Ghosh & John, 1999; Jap & Anderson, 2007). 
Uncertainty entails elements of genuine surprise up to the dimension of black swan 
events which appear highly improbable but bear high negative outcomes (Knight, 1921; 
Taleb, 2007). Contracting parties face genuine limitations to anticipate such events and to 
develop mutually satisfying contractual solutions (Ghosh & John, 1999; Jap & Anderson, 
2007).  
 Furthermore, the smart allocation of nonownership creates mutual dependencies 
for both parties (Ghosh & John, 1999; Jap & Anderson, 2007), such as upstream 
performance of R&D on downstream performance of commercialization, supply-chain-
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performance on distribution-channel performance, and indivisible processes 
communication interfaces shared by client and provider. To the extent that nonownership 
services aim for the long-term, clients and providers are exposed to negative surprises 
caused by uncertain events. Contracts bear the dilemma that ex-ante estimation of future 
conflicts of nonownership parties is costly if not unfeasible (Ghosh & John, 1990; 
Grossman & Hart, 1986; Jap & Ganesan, 2001). Uncertainty implies costs as well as 
pressure on nonownership partnerships to the extent of eventual break-up. In particular, 
the principal limitations of contracts limit the value propositions of nonownership 
implied by economic theories (see Table 1): 
• Contractual uncertainties impede contracting efficiency: Nonownership services 
may entail the investments of resources for the exclusive use in the client-provider 
relationship that lose value outside this relationship, such as communication 
interfaces, specialized employees like key-account managers, or special 
equipment like customized manufacturing plants. Such relationship-specific 
investments expose partners to hold-up and opportunism (Fang et al. 2008; 
Ndubisi, 2011; Williamson, 1985).  
• Resource uncertainties jeopardize management productivity: Nonownership 
services reside on both, client and provider, specializing on particular domains of 
the value creation process. Specialization creates coordination problems as both 
provider and client aim to develop hard to imitate resources and processes. 
Because of the uniqueness of specialized resources, knowledge of those resources 
cannot easily be codified and transmitted by the means of information 
technologies, rendering it the character of "tacit" knowledge (Polanyi, 1983; 
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Nonaka, 1994). Ensuring service performance relies on interoperability of 
processes and resources of providers and clients, e.g. synchronizing providers’ 
outbound logistics with clients' inbound logistics, or technology providers’ basic 
research with the clients’ product development. Because tacit knowledge is 
difficult to codify, contracts face a limitation in coordinating clients and 
providers.  
• Business uncertainties diminish complementary business opportunities: 
Complementary business opportunities reside on the expectation of both, the 
client and the provider that their business opportunities have mutual positive 
impact. (Arora, Belenzon, & Rios, 2014; Chesbrough, 2011). Identifying joint 
opportunities is not trivial and goes beyond codified information used for writing 
contracts. In addition, expectations entail uncertainties and the chance of failure, 
making contracts potentially inefficient. For example, one limitation of the 
performance of partnerships between biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms is 
that drugs developed by biotechnology firms proof useful for treatments of 
different treatments than originally expected. As a consequence, the licenses of 
their pharmaceutical partners proof less valuable than originally expected (Pisano, 
2006; Ernst & Young, 2013).  
 These uncertainty challenges present a potential limitation to the employment of 
nonownership services. 
RESOLVING THE NONOWNERSHIP PARADOX 
Complements to contracts for handling uncertainty 
 Nonownership contracts hold a paradox. The institution of ownership emerged as 
a response to the limitations of written contracts in aligning interests. Relational contract 
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theory holds that written contracts become effective as an element of a more complex set 
of social arrangements to orchestrate activities, align interests and resolve conflicts.  
The reasoning in the prior paragraphs applies to rational choice scenarios projected in 
classical contract theory that assumes that contracts are optimal bargaining solutions 
under sufficient information (Haase & Ehret, 2012; MacNeil, 1978). However, relational 
contracting theory conceives contracts as elements of relationships, and instruments of 
collaborating parties to take on opportunities through collaboration. As a consequence, 
relational contracting theory conceives the impact of relational governance norms that 
work beyond the written agreement and provide the social context for its performance. In 
essence, relational contracting theory assumes that contracts become effective through a 
social environment that makes incentives and sanctions effective (Ehret & Haase, 2012; 
Ivens & Blois, 2004; Macneil, 1978; 1980). 
Relationship Quality: Trust and Commitment 
The following section extends research on relational governance mechanisms to their 
potential contribution to handle uncertainties. It builds on the MacNeils general 
proposition that the relationship atmosphere shows an impact on the performance of 
contracts (see Figure 4). In the context of nonownership, relational governance 
mechanisms help providers and clients to address conflicts beyond the limited framework 
of contracts. Thus, relational governance complements contractual governance through 
the formation of trust and commitment.   
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
 Relational governance takes place when co-creating parties maintain social 
relationships for long-term gains, and accept and tolerate short-term sacrifices. This 
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makes commitment, where partners invest in order to maintain a relationship, the core 
characteristic of a relationship (Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Moorman, Deshpandé & Zaltman, 
1993).  Trust is the other core governance mechanism shaping interorganizational 
relationships (Morgan & Hunt, 1984). Marketing conceives trust as a key enabler of 
relational exchanges beyond pure "goods for money" transactions (Boulding et al., 2005). 
Accordingly, marketing has adopted a relational concept of trust as “a willingness to rely 
on an exchange partner in whom one has confidence” (Moorman, Zaltman & Deshpané’s 
(1993). Social sciences ground theories on trust in its potential to transform uncertainty in 
social relationships. This goes in hand with a broader understanding of trust that 
conventionally is used in marketing. “Trust (Vertrauen), in broadest sense of confidence 
in one’s expectations, is a basic fact of social life. In many situations, of course, man can 
choose in certain respects whether or not to bestow trust. But a complete absence of trust 
would prevent him even from getting up in the morning” (Luhmann, 1979: 4).  
This makes trust crucial in situations where information is incomplete or costly, 
enabling decision makers to act and unlock resources (Gigerenzer & ABC Research 
Group, 1999, Möllering, 2001; Simmel, 1990). Trust becomes particular valuable in the 
context of nonownership contracts, as core value propositions of nonownership are driven 
by uncertainty. Trust empowers providers and clients of nonownership services to face 
uncertainties beyond the pure contractual level (Botsman & Rogers, 2010; Fang et al. 
2008; Luhmann, 1979).  
Relational Governance in the context of Nonownership 
There is a rich body of research that shows both, rationale and evidence for the 
contribution of relational norms to the quality and performance of interorganizational 
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relationships. As discussed in the previous section,  nonownership contracts come with 
particular challenges for providers and clients. First, left to their own terms contracts 
come with limitations to allocate uncertainties, as providers and clients are unable to 
anticipate significant events with negative downsides for one or all parties. In addition, 
nonownership is built on a seamingly smart configuration of asymmetries, as asset 
ownership tends to imply particular business orientations, like upstream focus, 
exploration of asset technology potential or more general maximizaton of asset value, 
whereas clients benefit from focus on service outputs, thus exploiting technologies and 
targeting downstream markets.  
Relational contracting theory holds that relational governance mechanisms complement 
written contracts in aligning interests of economic actors. Thus, relational governance 
mechanisms empower clients and providers to transform uncertainties through social 
interaction and resolve conflicts from downside uncertainties. In the following section we 
discuss the specific relationship challenges arising in nonownership relationships and the 
potential contribution of relational governance approaches for resolving these coflicts. 
Communication 
In nonownership services providers' assets constitute the platform for service benefits for 
the clients' value chain. Thus, nononwership services tie provider assets to client 
processes. Information is crucial to link asset outputs to client requirements. This makes 
communiation and information sharing an essential element of nonownership services.  
Relationship marketing research frequently identifies communication as a factor with 
positive impact on trust and commitment to relationship partners. Relationship 
Communication is defined as the sharing of information between supplier and customer 
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(Ndubisi, Malhotra & Wah, 2009; Jap, S. D., & Anderson, E. (2007).  With regard to 
uncertainy, communication supports an understanding of interests, motives , as well as a 
means to coordinate activities of clients and providers. In the early stages of a 
nononwership relationship, communication of references and reputation helps to reduce 
uncertainty of the trustworthyness of a potential relationship partner (Jap & Anderson, 
2007). During the relationship, effective communication reduces uncertainty regarding 
actual service performance. In the case of industrial nonownership services, information 
sharing like real-time information on machine or plant performance enabled by sensors 
and internet technologies have been key features of nonownership services created 
around manufacturing assets like machines or plants (Grubic, 2014; Smith, 2013). 
Providers strengthen their capabilities to offer and achieve services levels if they are able 
to track performance of services under their operation across company boundaries. 
Conflict resolution handling 
Nonownership services are particularly exposed to potential conflicts. Contracting parties 
face a general limitation for anticipating events with potential downsides for 
nonownership services. Thus, nonownership contracts hold negative surprises while tying 
provider and client processes together for the service delivery. In additions, the structure 
of nonownership contracts implies asymmetric interests between owner-operators and 
nonowning clients. The promise to exploit the virtues of asymmetric ownership, by 
enforcing benefits from specialization comes with potential downsides.  
Dwyer, Schuhr & Oh (1987) define conflict handling as the ability of a relationship 
partner to minimize the negative impact of conflicts. Kaufmann points out, that effective 
conflict resolution builds on flexible, informal or interpersonal mechanisms. In essence, 
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partners need to be prepared to align interests beyond codified contracts (Ivens, 2006).  
Restraint in the Use of Power 
In nonownership services partners delegate a considerable share of power to each other. 
The client gets a limited authority over the providers' assets, as most apparent in the 
renting of assets like property, vehicles or machines. As clients use outputs for operations 
in their own value chain, providers gain considerable powers over the value creation 
process of their clients. Thus, for both parties the value of nonownership resides on a 
restriction to exercise power, i.e. to limit potential downsides and damages caused by the 
exercise of power.  
MacNeil (1978, 2000) holds that relational contracts, contracting parties delegate power 
to each other. Thus, providers and clients need to restrict their exercise of power for the 
benefit of relationship performance (Ivens, 2006; Kaufman & Dant, 1992;  
Long-term orientation 
Nonownership contracts enable the sharing of assets across organizational boundaries. 
Not every nonownership contract relates to longterm relationship, as apparent in short-
term car-rentals. However, for some clients nonownership contracts open the opportunity 
to shift entire business processes to specialized service providers (Quinn, 1992). While 
some nonownership transactions might be closed for short-term use of assets, such 
contracts enable long-term outsourcing of resources operated by the provider. When 
parties seek benefits of nonownership over the longterm, aims for short-term gain 
jeopardize commitment and trust in a relationship (Ganesan, 1994; Ivens, 2006). Thus, 
long-term orientation of relationship partners will show a positive effect on commitment 
and trust, thereby driving the value of nonownership. 
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Mutualism 
In nonownership services, partners seek to exploit advantages resulting from 
asymmetries, i.e. one party actively pursuing ownership and its implicaitons for 
positioning within value chains and technology exploitation, while the other party aiming 
to avoid ownership and its consequences at the same time. While nonownership value 
builds on expected virtues of such asymmetries, specialization of nonownership parties 
can also create conflicts.  Dant and Schul define mutualism as an actor’s attitude that the 
realisation of one’s own success passes through the partner’s common success (Dant 
and Schul, 1992). Thus, mutualism entails elements of solidarity and creates an 
atmosphre of "we' ness" (Jap & Anderson, 2007)  across organizational boundaries 
(Ivens, 2006; Ndubisi, Malhotra, & Wah, 2009) . In the context of nonownership, 
mutualism shows in providers who are conscious that their performance resides on the 
performance of their clients, while clients are aware of the condition of their suppliers 
wellbeing as a condition for their own success.  
 
Satisfaction 
Relationship research has shown theoretical rationale as well as strong empirical 
evidence that customer satisfaction supports the willingness of partners to maintain a 
relationship (Ndubisi, Malhotra & Wah, 2009; Anderson, 1994). Marketing researchers 
define satisfaction as the confirmation of expectations, whereas negative disconfirmation 
harms satisfaction (Hirchman, 1970; Richins, 1983;  Singh, 1988). Thus, positive 
satisfaction with nonownership services will reduce uncertainties for clients and 
providers and will show positive effect on commitment and trust. Providers and clients 
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with a history of positive experiences will show a higher tolerance for negative incidents, 
compared to partners with negative or absent experiences (Lovelock, Patterson & 
Walker, 1988).  
Drawing on MacNeil (1978, 2000), marketing researchers identify relational 
norms as solidarity, long-term orientation, information exchange, flexibility, monitoring, 
planning behavior, mutuality, conflict resolution, and the use of power as the main norms 
that cater to the performance of a relationship (Ivens & Blois, 2004; Jap & Anderson, 
2007). Relational norms become particularly important in situations when short-term 
sacrifices endanger the capabilities of parties to collaborate for long-term gain.  
   
 
RELATIONAL APPROACHES AND THE EXPLORATION AND 
EXPLOITATION OF NONOWNERSHIP VALUE -THE CASE OF ROLLS 
ROYCE AIRPLANE ENGINES  
Rolls-Royce, one of the world’s largest aircraft engine manufacturers, is an industrial 
pioneer of nonownership services. In addition to its offering of engines, Rolls Royce has 
started to offer services to the point where it becomes part of the operation of a flight. 
This service business has been growing in both, the defense as well as in the commercial 
businesses since 2004, the year Rolls Royce started to report its service revenues. While 
service revenues grow continuously and revolve between 50-60% of total revenue, 
industry reports suggest that they contribute to around 70% of total profits of Rolls-
Royce aviation business. (Economist 2011; see fig. 6 and 7) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
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Insert fig. 6 and 7 about here 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 In its “Power-by-the-Hour” business model Rolls-Royce takes on uncertainties of 
airlines in operating aircraft engines, literally becoming an entrepreneur of flight 
operation-uncertainties, while airlines take on the role of entrepreneur of flight-
commercialization uncertainties. Client airlines pay Rolls-Royce only for the time the 
airplane engines are effectively in the air. Thereby, Rolls-Royce takes-over uncertainties 
of its clients related to the operation of the flight, while it gains opportunities from 
enhancing reliability and increasing efficiency of operations. 
 The benefits of this scheme became apparent from the first Power-by-the-Hour 
contract Rolls-Royce closed with its pioneer customer the US navy. In the first year the 
US navy was able to raise availability of airplanes from 70% to 85 %, and the average 
time the US navy could use an engine before it needed to be removed increased from 700 
to 900 hours. At the same time, maintenance costs of the US navy where transformed 
from an uncertain cost driven by aircraft contingencies, to a pre-agreed cost for Rolls-
Royce’s services (Smith, 2013). The role of these pioneering projects highlights also the 
role of satisfaction in transforming uncertainties, showing evidence that the 
nonownership service is feasible and beneficial for both parties.  
 Rolls-Royce and the US Navy built these results on prior relationships. Rolls 
Royce pioneered the system with key customers, first as an element of military contracts. 
In the first three years of the contract the US navy could achieve annual cost savings from 
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USD5 million to USD18 million (Smith, 2013). Prior established personal relationships 
where key in pioneering the nonownership contract and implement its benefits. This 
illustrates how becoming an owner transforms the responsibility of the supplier and its 
impact on service quality. It also shows the impact of interpersonal relationships in 
identifying value propositions of nonownership services and establish interorganizational 
relationships for their exploitation. Personal relationship where instrumental in the use of 
communication to build up trust and create a relationship atmosphere conducive for the 
performance of nonownership contracts.  
 If things go wrong, both parties are harmed, but the potential damage is typically 
much higher for the client. For example, the entire A380 fleet of Qantas was grounded 
because engine problems; or a manufacturing line will be at a standstill as long as a 
malfunctioning supplier-operated machine cannot be repaired. While in many cases like 
these, companies find themselves in front of courts, Rolls-Royce showed commitment 
and engaged swiftly in solving the problems. This highlights the role of mutuality and 
mechanisms for conflict resultion in enabling nonownership services 
 Power-by-the-Hour was made possible by investments into information systems 
that allows Rolls-Royce to track the performance of its engines in real-time (Smith, 
2013). These monitoring and tracking systems are also key elements in fostering systems 
trust of Rolls Royce clients. As predicted by property rights theory, reduced information 
costs made supplier-ownership feasible. In addition, airlines and Rolls-Royce where able 
to strengthen their managerial focus, either towards passenger service in the case of the 
airlines, and on technology in the case of Rolls-Royce. In the case of Rolls-Royce, it also 
shifted its focus on the long-term reliability of its engines, thereby driving down the costs 
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of repair and maintenance, thus directly increasing profits for Rolls-Royce in the short-
term, but enhancing system efficiency for all players in the long run. Thus, long-term 
orientation played a key role in establhing the service.  
 Contracts do not suffice to unlock the nonownership benefits for Rolls-Royce and 
its clients. One prime mover is Rolls-Royce’s commitment. This becomes credible by 
Rolls Royce’s investment in global information and tracking systems that are a lock-in 
for Rolls-Royce and tie its fate on the performance of its services. Rolls-Royce 
complements this by investments into its corporate brand and its “Power-by-the-Hour” 
label that tie the fate of its service-business to an audience in the sense of an institutional 
commitment (Lohmann, 2005). Rolls-Royce’s financial performance that demonstrates 
the attractiveness of its Power-by-the-Hour service and is substantial pricing power are 
shown in Tables 5 and 6) 
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here] 
RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
Trust as the Key to the Potential Market for Nonownership Services 
 In his pioneering contribution on the social context of economic reality, 
Granovetter (1985) showed the downsides of underestimating as well as overemphasizing 
the impact of social relationships on economic value. In a similar vein, managers and 
researchers need to look at the interplay of contracts and relationships in unlocking the 
value of nonownership and the sharing economy.  
 The challenges become apparent in current business models aiming at the 
widespread diffusion of nonownership services. For example, cloud-based services like 
AirBnB, Salesforce.com or Uber demonstrate the potential of smart IT-design to enhance 
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the feasibility and reliability of resource sharing, engineer conditions that favor the 
realization of nonownership value propositions and reduce the costs of resource-sharing. 
At the same time, current challenges of these services clearly demonstrate the need to 
maintain the human factor in these systems. The current challenges of sharing services to 
win the trust of potential customers provides promising opportunities for interdisciplinary 
research in particular at the interface of the social sciences and IT engineering. 
The challenges of the sharing economy underscore the need to develop the social 
dimension of the business. For researchers this is a fascinating opportunity to unveil the 
dimension of social relationships and show evidence for relational approaches as well as 
their impact on performance of nonownership and sharing businesses.  
Uncertainty Sharing and the Organization of Value Co-creation  
 Service research has made significant progress by identifying co-creation as a key 
element of service processes (Vargo & Lusch, 2004; Ballantyne & Varey, 2008). 
However, the almost unaddressed questions still to be answered by service research is 
why and how co-creation should be divided between companies or between consumers 
and companies. In other words, why and to what extent does economic organization 
matter for co-creation and the provision of services. Nonownership approaches (Lovelock 
& Gummesson, 2004; Ehret & Wirtz, 2010; Wittkowski, Moeller, & Wirtz, 2013) 
provide the inroad to address these problems. They are both starting points for more 
comprehensive and consistent theories of co-creation as well as implying practical means 
for uncertainty transformation, such as the design of contracts, the use of IT-systems, the 
exploration of technologies or the cultivation of social relationships. 
While it is apparent, that uncertainty plays a key role in the different modes of value 
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cocreation, this opens significant opportunities for researchers for unveiling various 
approaches to handle uncerainties in value cocreation. Some of the most interesting are 
the contribution of IT-systems in sharing uncertainties across organizational boundaries, 
the use of real-options for the financial valuation of uncertainty in value cocreation and 
not least the contribution of social relationships for handling uncertainties (as outlined in 
this article).  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Economic theory identifies three types of value propositions offered by nonownership 
services. They are (1) to enhance contracting efficiency, (2) to foster management 
productivity, and (3) to empower companies to explore mutual beneficial business 
opportunities. Nonownership contracts are the core building block of value propositions 
of nonownership services as they transform downside uncertainties of clients into 
business opportunities of providers. However, written contracts entail severe limitations 
because uncertainty defies ex-ante specification. 
 In a classical contract law perspective, nonownership contracts appear as a 
paradox, as the institution of ownership becomes valuable in situations where it is 
impossible or too costly to write contracts. In contrast, relational contract theory 
conceives contracts as legal elements of social relationships. From a relational 
contracting perspective, social relationships enable contracting parties to handle 
uncertainties which cannot be captured by contracts and thereby enable the exploitation 
of nonownership service value propositions. 
 Relational governance mechanisms help parties to handle uncertainties beyond 
the limited domain of written contracts. Because nonownership contracts aim to provide a 
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response to uncertainty, relational approaches enhance the sustainability of 
nonownership. Because of the high potential for conflicts apparent in nonownership, 
relational governance mechanisms are a crucial, but oftentimes neglected element of 
nonownership business models. 
 This paper extends literature of relational governance by elaborating its potential 
for uncertainty sharing. It contributes to the growing body of research on nonownership 
services by elaborating the role of governance mechanisms to help to fulfill the promise 
of specialization for business opportunities.  
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Table 1: Growth index for US Service Industries 1947-2013 
 
Service Industry 
Relative 
growth 
between 
1947 and 
20141  
   Wholesale trade 0,67 
   Retail trade 0,44 
   Transportation and warehousing 0,36 
   Information 1,17 
   Finance and insurance 2,14 
   Real estate and rental and leasing 1,14 
  Professional and business services 2,55 
  Educational services, health care, and social assistance 3,08 
  Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services 0,80 
   Other services, except government 0,51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
1 (levels above 1 indicate higher share within the service sector, values below indicate a 
reduced share witin the services secto 
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Table 2: Nonownership contracts and the allocation of Entrepreneurial roles 
 
 
 
d 
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Figure 1: The share of goods (primary and secondary sector) and service industries 
in US GDP 
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Figure 2: Composition of US Service Industries from 1947-2014 
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Figure 3: The share of goods and services industries in intermediate inputs for value 
creation. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
Share of Total Share of goods
in Business Inputs
Share of Total Share of
Services in Business Inputs
  51 
 
Figure 4: The Allocation of Entrepreneneurial roles by Nonownership contracts 
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Figure 5: The impact of relational governance mechanisms on nonownership value 
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Figure 6: Underlying Revenue and service revenue of Rolls Royce CivilAerospace.  
 
 
Source: Rolls Royce annual reports. 
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Figure 7: Underlying Revenue and service revenue of Rolls Royce Defense 
Aerospace. 
 
 
 
Source: Rolls Royce annual reports. 
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